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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT FOLLOWS
HALL STREET PRECEDENCE, VOIDS ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN GAMBLING
COMPACT: A COMMENT ON CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION V. OKLAHOMA
By
Mary Bonacchi*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. has had
a wide-ranging impact upon the types of review permitted under the Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”) in the United States. The court in Hall Street held that the only permissible
forms of review in arbitration are listed in 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 of the FAA.1 Those remedies
are exclusive, and parties subject to the FAA may not contract for a different method of
review by the courts.2 This principle was recently examined in Citizen Potawatomi Nation
v. Oklahoma.3 In this case, an arbitration clause within a gambling compact was deemed
void when the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that an
impermissible de novo review provision violated the FAA.4 This case allowed the Tenth
Circuit to re-examine the principles of the Hall Street case and re-assert the reasoning for
rejecting de novo review of an arbitration proceeding by the federal courts.5 This case
demonstrates that the principles first expressed in Hall Street are still the preference of the
Tenth Circuit. Citizen Potawatomi Nation also establishes that while contract freedom is a
cornerstone of American arbitration, parties to an arbitration agreement will not be
permitted to exceed the limited review areas permitted by the FAA in sections 9,10, and
11.6 Finally, this case illustrates the uneven bargaining power that may exist in the
arbitration process when one party, even another sovereign party, agrees to sign an
arbitration agreement with a much savvier and powerful legal opponent.
II.

CASE BACKGROUND

On November 30, 2004, the Chairman of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“the Nation”)
signed a Tribal-state gambling compact (“the Compact”) with the state of Oklahoma.7 The
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Compact, which became effective on February 9, 2005, allowed Class III gaming to take
place on tribal lands.8 The Compact stated the sovereignty of both parties, and the historic
right of the Nation to self-determination and self-governance.9 The Compact focused on
the gambling rights that the Nation would enjoy at their two facilities, the FireLake Grand
Casino and the FireLake Entertainment Center, and the responsibilities of the parties
towards each other.10 Part 5(I) of the Compact stated that the tribal facilities had to be in
compliance with Oklahoma and tribal alcohol laws.11 The Compact’s arbitration clause
provided for the parties to submit any disputes arising under the Compact to arbitration
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). In addition, the
Compact stated that “either party to the Compact may bring an action against the other in
a federal district court for the de novo review of any arbitration award under paragraph 2
[the arbitration clause] of this Part. The decision of the court shall be subject to appeal.”12
Issues between the parties began when Oklahoma’s Alcohol Beverage Laws
Enforcement Commission (“ABLE”) alleged that the Nation was selling alcohol on
Sundays in violation of Oklahoma law.13 As ABLE began proceedings against the Nation,
the Oklahoma Tax Commission (“the OTC”) also sent a request to obtain the sales tax
returns of the Nation regarding their alcohol sales.14 Oklahoma Law required the Nation to
obtain licenses from both ABLE and the OTC.15Both ABLE and the OTC were able to
revoke those licenses if a violation was committed.16 In response to these allegations, and
while the ABLE and OTC proceedings were ongoing, the Nation invoked the arbitration
clause of the Compact.17 The Nation believed that the ABLE allegations and alcohol sales
tax issues fell under Compact Part 5(I).18 Oklahoma moved to dismiss the Nation’s
arbitration claim, arguing that, as the substantive issues central to the dispute were
regulatory, they should be handled through administrative proceedings as opposed to
arbitration.19 The arbitrator ruled that the issue was arbitrable, agreeing with the Nation’s
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theory that the arbitration agreement in the Compact was the only remedy for licensing
disputes.20
The arbitrator then conducted a hearing, where the Nation prevailed.21 The arbitrator
ruled that the sovereignty of the Nation prevented Oklahoma from enforcing a sales tax on
items sold by the Nation.22 The arbitrator enjoined Oklahoma from attempting to halt the
Nation’s ability to sell alcohol at Compact facilities or from taking further legal action
against the Nation to force them to pay state sales taxes.23
After the award was announced, the Nation filed an action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma to enforce the award; Oklahoma filed a motion
for vacatur of the award.24 Along with other claims, including their insistence that the
arbitration went beyond the bounds of the Compact, Oklahoma argued that they were
entitled to de novo review of the “factual and legal issues” in the arbitration hearing.25 The
district court found for the Nation, agreeing with the arbitrator’s determinations with
regards to the Compact, and ordered that the award be enforced.26 Speaking to Oklahoma’s
assertion that they were entitled to de novo review, the district court found that Oklahoma’s
argument was “foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.”27 The district court found that, in
accordance with Supreme Court precedence in the Hall Street decision, only those grounds
contained in §§ 10 or 11 of the FAA could modify or vacate an arbitration award; the de
novo review contained in the Compact was impermissibly broad and not within the scope
of §§ 10 and 11.28 While the district court noted that the de novo review was improper, they
did not enter into a discussion as to whether the entire arbitration clause was nullified by
the de novo review provision.29
On appeal, Oklahoma made several arguments as to why the arbitration award should
be vacated based on the merits of the arbitration, namely that the issues were not all
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arbitrated and that the matters arbitrated exceeded the arbitrator’s power.30 Oklahoma,
however, also advanced two theories as to the de novo review portion of the arbitration
agreement.31 First, Oklahoma argued that the district court erred in not granting de novo
review on the merits which the Compact provided for.32 Specifically, Oklahoma argued
that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“the IGRA”), and its preference for federal
litigation to resolve disputes, overruled the FAA.33 In Oklahoma’s view, as the Secretary
of the Interior had approved the Compact, Hall Street and the FAA could not discredit it.34
In the alternative, the state argued that if de novo review was prohibited, then the district
court should have severed the arbitration agreement from the Compact, as the de novo
review provision was a material aspect of the arbitration clause of the Compact.35
The Nation argued that disallowing the de novo review clause would not make the
arbitration agreement invalid; the de novo review clause simply could be separated from
the rest of the Compact.36 The Nation also did not provide that any portion of the Compact
was ambiguous.37 They instead pointed to extrinsic evidence they presented during the
arbitration to assert that the de novo provision was not material to the Compact.38 Finally,
the Nation suggested that if the arbitration clause was invalidated, the ability to resolve
future disputes between the Nation and Oklahoma would be compromised, as would their
sovereignty which the Nation had sought to protect.39
III.

APPELLATE COURT’S ANALYSIS

To begin their analysis, the Tenth Circuit dismissed several of Oklahoma’s claims as
irrelevant to the central issue of the case.40 The court determined that it would be
unproductive to look at the merits of the arbitrator’s award or use other forms of review.41
30
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If de novo review was determined to be a material aspect of the Compact, then the
arbitration agreement would be void, making any other analysis moot.42 The court,
therefore, mainly focused on the claims of materiality and severability of the arbitration
clause raised by Oklahoma. 43
The court began its analysis by examining whether the de novo review portion of the
arbitration agreement was invalid.44 The court “quickly disposed” of the notion that the de
novo review prescribed in the Compact was “still valid and enforceable.”45 While
Oklahoma argued that the principles behind the IGRA overruled the FAA, the appellate
court disagreed.46 The appellate court found that no policies that Oklahoma cited could
overrule the FAA and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street.47 The court reasoned
that no portion of the IGRA affected arbitration, nor expressed supremacy over the FAA.48
As the purpose of the FAA was to create an expedited review of judicial matters, the
appellate court was unwilling to view the IGRA as overruling the FAA.49 The court
finished its review of this issue by stating, “Because Hall Street Associates makes clear the
de novo review provision set out in Compact Part 12(3) is legally invalid, this court must
turn to the question whether that provision is a material aspect of the parties' agreement to
engage in binding arbitration.”50
The Tenth Circuit then moved to the issue of whether the de novo portion of the
arbitration agreement was a material part of the parties’ agreement and, if it was, could
therefore be severed from the Compact in part or in full.51 The court determined that the
decision in Hall Street did not discuss whether severability of the arbitration clause was
the correct remedy to an improper de novo review clause.52 Therefore, Hall Street did not
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have any bearing on whether the arbitration clause could be severable.53 The Tenth Circuit
then engaged in its own severability analysis.54
The court’s severability analysis began by stating precedent from previous cases.55
The court established that not only was arbitration based in contract law, but when
enforcing an arbitration agreement, a court might invalidate the arbitration agreement
based on traditional contract defenses.56 A gaming compact is a contract.57 As such, the
Compact was subject to contract law and federal common law.58 Federal common law
principles wouldthen determine if the de novo review clause was a material part of the
contract.59 The court noted that federal contract law states that if a contract is not
ambiguous, the court will determine the meaning of the contract from its wording only.60
Parol, or extrinsic, evidence, can only be considered if the terms of the contract are
unclear.61 Using this standard, “[w]hen considered as a whole,” the court stated, “[c]ompact
Part 12 makes clear that the parties' agreement to engage in binding arbitration was
specifically conditioned on, and inextricably linked to, the availability of de novo review
in federal court.”62
The court then examined the Compact itself.63 First, the Compact itself contained a
severability provision, which analyzed whether the parties would have agreed to the
arbitration clause if the de novo review section was not included.64 Second, while the
Compact contained a waiver of sovereign immunity to allow for de novo review by a
53
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federal court; this waiver did not apply to other portions of the arbitration agreement and
demonstrated to the appellate court that de novo review was a material part of the contract.65
Finally, the court dismissed the Nation’s reliance on extrinsic evidence and their claim that
voiding the arbitration clause would result in future Compact enforcement problems
between the Nation and the state of Oklahoma.66 Since the Compact as it was written was
not ambiguous, and the extrinsic evidence provided was not relevant to the materiality of
the de novo review provision, the court declined to give these arguments weight in their
analysis.67 As for the Nation’s fears about enforcement problems, the court was dismissive,
stating that public policy concerns could not override a court’s determination that a material
element of a contract was improper.68
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit held that the de novo review portion of the Compact
was a material part of the arbitration agreement and that the Supreme Court’s precedence
in Hall Street barred de novo review.69 Therefore, the arbitration clause of the Compact
was severed and invalidated.70 As a result, the court ordered that the case be remanded to
the district court, and that the arbitration award should be vacated.71
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

The federal courts’ preference for judicial deference to arbitration has allowed parties
to contract their arbitration with little interference from federal courts.72 The Hall Street
case represented a recent limitation that affected the contracting powers of parties creating
an arbitration agreement.73 This limitation significantly affected the outcome in Citizen
Potawatomi Nation, where not complying with Hall Street led to the severing of the parties’
arbitration clause from their gambling compact.74 This decision is significant in several
ways, as it reaffirms: (1) that the pre- Hall Street circuit split has been resolved; (2) that
federal arbitration policies still have preference over state concerns; and (3) that an
65
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incorrect review provision of an arbitration agreement in violation of the Hall Street
precedent can sever the entire arbitration agreement.
In the years before the Hall Street decision, the federal circuits were split as to whether
review provisions, like the one at the center of Citizen Potawatomi Nation, could exist
within the framework of the FAA.75 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits held in several cases that
parties “may not contract for expanded judicial review.”76 The Eighth Circuit expressed
agreement with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, albeit in dicta.77 However, the First, Third,
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits allowed the expanded grounds for judicial review in their
opinions.78 The Fourth Circuit also supported this position in an unpublished opinion.79
The Supreme Court in Hall Street ended the circuit split over whether parties could add
other grounds than the ones listed in Section 10 of the FAA to institute judicial review of
an arbitration decision.80 By upholding their past precedence and the precedent in Hall
Street, the Tenth Circuit in Citizen Potawatomi Nation re-affirmed that expanded judicial
review is not permitted by sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit roundly rejected that federal or state law principles
could overrule the FAA.81 Oklahoma had argued that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
and the approval of their Secretary of the Interior should take precedence before the FAA
when deciding if the arbitration clause was valid.82 The Tenth Circuit’s dismissal of these
arguments was significant, demonstrating that the FAA and the Hall Street decision were
not limited by other principles of federal law. The limitation on review that would normally
be allowed by other federal statutes shows that the arbitration policy laid out in Hall Street
will be binding on arbitration, even if other statutes are implicated.
Finally, this case answers a question that was left untouched by the Hall Street court,
whether an arbitration agreement could be severed from a contract if it contained an
impermissible review provision.83 Before the Tenth Circuit decided Citizen Potawatomi
75
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Nation, it was unclear whether an entire arbitration clause could be severed from a contract.
The district court, in initially taking the case, only sought to invalidate the offending de
novo portion of the agreement.84 However, the appellate court rejected this analysis.85 The
court instead applied contract law to the agreement and determined the materiality of a
non-approved method of review to the arbitration agreement determines whether it will
invalidate the entire arbitration agreement or just that individual clause.86
V.

CRITIQUE

Citizen Potawatomi Nation highlights several issues with the arbitral process that are
still debated throughout the United States. First, the case demonstrates that severing an
arbitration clause can leave the parties to a contract without remedy. Second, while contract
freedom is valued in arbitration, there is a limit as to what the courts and the FAA will
permit. Finally, this case demonstrates that when there is a perceived unfairness in an
arbitration, or one party to a contract is perceived to have greater bargaining power than
the other, arbitration has the potential to be distrusted by the public.
The central issue of Citizen Potawatomi Nation was whether the arbitration clause as a
whole was severable, or if the de novo review portion of the Compact alone was
severable.87 To make this determination, the court engaged in a materiality analysis.88 If
the de novo review clause was a material part of the contract, then it would invalidate the
entire arbitration clause; if not, then only the de novo review portion of the Compact would
be struck.89 The Tenth Circuit’s materiality analysis was straightforward and based in wellestablished contract principles, providing a clear roadmap for the district courts in their
circuit.
However, even if the Tenth Circuit correctly determined the materiality of the de novo
provision, the court’s vacatur of award and their severing of the arbitration clause did away
with the only form of relief available to both Oklahoma and the Nation under the Compact.
The Compact was created by the Oklahoma legislature for the purpose of engaging with
various sovereign native nations that reside within the state’s borders with regards to
gaming issues.90 The separation of the arbitration clause in the Compact does not just affect
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the parties in this case, but any nation that has signed a gambling compact with
Oklahoma.91 Each of those parties now has no clear remedy to resolve disputes under the
Compact.92 While the court’s legal conclusion may have been technically correct, the court
inappropriately dismissed the public policy concerns inherent in declaring the Compact’s
arbitration clause void, as doing so created far reaching enforcement issues for both native
nations and Oklahoma.
Furthermore, contract freedom is also curtailed in Citizen Potawatomi Nation through
the precedent of its predecessor, Hall Street. The power of parties to contract into an
arbitration agreement that offers review of the arbitration is limited by the decision of Hall
Street and the remedies listed in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.93 Oklahoma vigorously
argued before that Tenth Circuit that the arbitration clause that the state and the Nation had
contracted for was allowed by federal law, and therefore, should not be severed from the
compact.94 However, in both this decision and in Hall Street, the federal courts have
maintained that measures not in the FAA may not be contracted into an arbitration
agreement.95 As the Hall Street court maintained, the FAA made it clear that the forms of
review in sections 9 through 11 were exclusive.96 No contract and no federal regulations
can circumvent the dictates of Hall Street.
In addition, the outcome of the case could be seen to reinforce a pervasive criticism of
arbitration: the stronger, better-equipped party in an arbitration agreement will prevail over
the weaker party. The Compact was an Oklahoma law, and the Citizen Potawatomi Nation
paid more than $4 million in 2017 in exclusivity fees to be a party to this Compact.97 The
Nation received a favorable outcome from the arbitration process they were compelled to
agree to by the terms of the Compact.98 The state of Oklahoma then argued against the very
arbitration clause it had created, stating that the clause was invalid due to the precedent in
Hall Street.99 The court’s decision to sever the entire arbitration agreement removes a form
of recourse that the Citizen Potawatomi Nation saw as essential to maintaining their
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sovereignty.100 Judge Murphy, writing for the court, admitted that, in his opinion, the
Nation would more than likely waive its sovereign immunity when taking new complaints
before a federal court as opposed to their previous arbitration proceedings.101 To the Citizen
Potawatomi Nation, that has been the focus of Oklahoma’s attempt to widen its taxation
jurisdiction, as well as the wider native community that has seen five recent Indian Law
petitions to the Supreme Court rejected (including the writ of certiorari for the present
case), the decision in Citizen Potawatomi Nation only serves as another example of a
disparate arbitration and court system that ignores native sovereignty.102
VI.

CONCLUSION

Citizen Potawatomi Nation was decided according to the precedent set by the
Supreme Court in Hall Street.103 However, freedom of contract issues, disputes between
federal laws, and public policy concerns raise several questions as to the viability of such
a precedent. For the time being, however, the circuit split of the pre-Hall Street days104
remains in the past and the federal courts seem willing to sever arbitration agreements
that run afoul of this case. When formulating their arbitration agreements, parties must
ensure that their contracts do not contain methods of review not explicitly mentioned in
the FAA. While the Nation and Oklahoma must wait until the present Compact expires in
2020 to create a new Compact, the decision of the Tenth Circuit gives the parties a clear
guideline as to what methods of review are acceptable.105
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